Last Year’s Consent Form, This Year’s GLP-1 Warning.

Credit: Caitlin A. Koppenhaver, Esq.

On November 9, 2026, FDA announced a new labeling requirement for approved GLP-1 medications, including semaglutide and tirzepatide. The warning concerns a rare eye condition that can cause permanent vision loss. Many patients taking these medications today decided to start treatment before FDA issued the warning. For those patients, the warning may affect whether they choose to continue treatment.

FDA’s findings

FDA identified a possible increased risk of non-arteritic anterior ischemic optic neuropathy (NAION), which can cause sudden, painless vision loss in one eye. Across 126 randomized trials, FDA identified 15 probable cases. The rate was 6.4 cases per 100,000 person-years among patients taking a GLP-1, compared with 3.8 among those receiving a placebo or another type of diabetes medication. Cases were rare in both groups. FDA advises patients to report sudden vision changes in one eye immediately and recommends prompt referral to an ophthalmologist if the treating clinician suspects NAION.

FDA’s labeling requirement applies to approved GLP-1 medications. Its review did not establish a separate rate of NAION for compounded semaglutide or tirzepatide. Patients considering a compounded GLP-1 should still have the opportunity to weigh the available safety information, the expected benefits, and the alternatives appropriate for them.

Informed consent as new information emerges

Clinicians who prescribe GLP-1s and other emerging peptide therapies have a responsibility to stay current on safety information relevant to their patients. A wellness practice can update its consent form the day FDA issues a warning, but a patient returning for a refill may never see the revised form. When FDA or another regulator identifies a potential risk that could affect a patient’s decision to continue treatment, the prescribing clinician should revisit the risks, benefits, and reasonable alternatives with that patient. The patient can then decide whether the treatment still makes sense for them. A brief note in the patient’s chart can document the discussion and the patient’s decision.

From Marketing Claims to Warning Letters: Stem Cells, Exosomes and FDA Scrutiny

By: Victoria Perniola, Attorney at Law

An IV hydration practice advertised stem cell and exosome treatments for tissue repair, recovery and rejuvenation. The FDA responded with a warning letter which identified the products as unapproved drugs and unlicensed biologics.

The FDA issued the warning letter to Calibrate IV Hydration in October 2026, less than three weeks after sending a similar letter to Beaute Bounty, a beauty product distributor selling stem cell and placenta-derived products online. For IV practices considering regenerative services, these two warning letters show why a product’s availability from a supplier does not establish that it can lawfully be offered for the proposed treatment.

Softer Marketing Language Still Draws Scrutiny From the FDA

Calibrate’s website promoted stem cell IV treatments, exosome IV treatments and combination packages with claims about neurological function, tissue repair and inflammation management. The FDA cited these claims in determining the intended uses of the practice’s umbilical cord-derived and exosome products.

Some statements used cautious wording, including “supports” and “may aid.” Those qualifiers did not prevent the FDA from classifying the products as drugs and biologics requiring authorization. For IV practices, the concern extends to claims about how a treatment affects the body, even when the marketing stops short of promising to treat or cure a disease.

Beaute Bounty’s Claims Went Beyond Beauty

In its September 25, 2026 letter to Beaute Bounty, the FDA identified Evgenis Totipotent Embryonic Stem Cells, marketed as an embryonic stem cell product, and two human placenta-derived products, Laennec and Melsmon Placenta Japan. The seller promoted these offerings with claims extending from skin rejuvenation to the treatment of diabetes and neurological conditions.

The company’s beauty focus did not determine the cited products’ regulatory status. The FDA evaluated their intended uses and claims and classified them as drugs and biologics. Although the products differed from those offered by Calibrate, both businesses faced allegations that they were selling unapproved drugs and unlicensed biologics.

Both letters warned that unresolved violations could lead to further action, including seizure or injunction. They communicate the FDA’s enforcement position and give the recipients an opportunity to respond; they are not court judgments.

What an HCT/P Label Does Not Tell You

Human cells, tissues, or cellular or tissue-based products, commonly called HCT/Ps, can fall under different federal requirements. Whether an HCT/P can be regulated solely under Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act depends on meeting specific federal criteria. The label alone does not establish that status.

One criterion is homologous use: the tissue is intended to perform the same basic function in the recipient that it performed in the donor. The FDA’s guidance on HCT/P regulation explains how intended use, including advertising, affects that analysis. The agency found that criterion unmet for Beaute Bounty’s identified tissue products and Calibrate’s umbilical cord-derived product. Calibrate’s exosome products were separately identified as unapproved drugs and unlicensed biologics.

The FDA has also expressly cautioned that establishment registration and product listing do not establish that a regenerative product is legally marketed.

The Product Behind the Treatment: Why Due Diligence Is Necessary

Before purchasing a regenerative product or adding a new treatment, an IV practice should engage legal counsel experienced in healthcare regulation and regenerative products to conduct an in-depth review of the product’s regulatory status, intended use and marketing language used across websites, social media, and all patient-facing materials. Supplier assurances should also be evaluated against the product’s labeling, regulatory status, and evidence supporting any claimed therapeutic benefits.

These warning letters demonstrate how public-facing marketing materials can become part of the FDA’s enforcement analysis. Statements about therapeutic or regenerative effects can draw attention to an offering and provide evidence of the product’s intended use. Adopting a supplier’s promotional language can expose a provider to the same concerns, even when the provider assumes that the supplier has already addressed compliance.

The legal implications hinge on the details of the offering and how it is presented to patients. A comprehensive legal review and advice tailored to those facts can help businesses assess their exposure before committing financial resources to a new service or continuing to promote an existing one.

Florida Healthcare Law Firm advises IV therapy businesses and medical directors on regenerative product offerings and the marketing used to promote them. Before launching, expanding or continuing a regenerative service, contact our team to evaluate the legal basis for the offering and the claims being made to patients.

Whistleblower Retaliation Claims in Florida Health Care: Why an Actual Violation Matters

By: Anita Browning, FRP, Law Clerk

An employee’s reasonable belief that an employer’s actions or conduct is illegal is no longer enough to support a whistleblower retaliation claim in Florida. The Florida Supreme Court has now made clear that the employee must prove the employer’s practice actually broke the law. 

The Florida Private Whistleblower Act

The Florida Private Whistleblower Act, §§ 448.101-105 of the Florida Statutes, protects employees from retaliatory personnel action when they object to, or refuse to participate in, an employer’s activity, policy, or practice that violates a law, rule, or regulation. Employees often bring these claims after a termination or demotion that followed an internal complaint.

The central question has long been how much an employee must prove about the underlying violation. Was it enough that the employee sincerely and reasonably believed the employer was breaking the law?

The Florida Supreme Court’s Answer: An Actual Violation

In Gessner v. Southern Co., 435 So. 3d 8 (Fla. 2026), the Florida Supreme Court addressed this question for claims under section 448.102(3). The employee in that case had raised workplace safety concerns, including alleged violations of OSHA requirements. The trial court, and the First District Court of Appeal, ruled for the employer, and the Supreme Court agreed on the following points:

  • The employee must show an actual violation, not a suspected one. To prevail, the employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s activity, policy, or practice was in fact a violation of a law, rule, or regulation.
  • “Good faith, objectively reasonable belief” is not enough. The Court declined to read that standard into the statute. Section 448.102(3) does not refer to the employee’s state of mind, and the Court concluded the Legislature did not intend to add it.
  • The pleading burden is real. To survive a motion to dismiss, an employee must allege ultimate facts about the employer’s activity, policy, or practice that, if proven, would amount to a violation of law.

The Court’s reasoning builds on the Second District’s earlier decision in Schultz v. Tampa Electric Co., 704 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). There, an employee sent a memo objecting to his employer’s conduct but never identified a law, rule, or regulation the employer violated. The complaint was dismissed because disagreement alone did not describe unlawful activity.

The practical effect is that a retaliation claim can be tested early. If the conduct the employee objected to was lawful, the claim should fail, whatever the employee believed at the time.

Why This Matters for Patient Privacy Complaints

Health care employers see a particular version of this problem: an employee objects that sharing patient information internally violates HIPAA, and then claims retaliation. The first question is whether the disclosure was in fact unlawful. Often, it was not.

The federal rule. Under 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c), a covered entity may use and disclose protected health information (PHI) for treatment, payment, and health care operations without patient authorization. Participants in an organized health care arrangement may also share PHI with one another for any health care operations activity of that arrangement.

The Florida rule. Florida courts have applied section 456.057 of the Florida Statutes consistently with the federal rule. In Estate of Stephens v. Galen Health Care, Inc., 911 So. 2d 277, 282 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), the court held that a physician does not unlawfully disclose confidential patient information by discussing it within the chain of health care communication, including with management and with a hospital’s risk manager. Lee Memorial Health System v. Smith, 40 So. 3d 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), cites and follows the same rule.

Taken together, a physician who shares patient information with managing officers, or with non-clinical staff acting in a management or risk function, to review how a patient was treated is generally engaged in health care operations inside the same organization. That is not the kind of disclosure the privacy laws prohibit.

A Question of Law, Not Fact

This framework also shapes how these cases can be decided. In many privacy-based retaliation claims, there is no real dispute that the employee worked for the facility or that the information was PHI. What remains is a legal question: does the disclosure fall within the exceptions in section 456.057 and 45 C.F.R. § 164.506? A court can answer that on a motion to dismiss, before the expense of discovery.

Combined with Gessner, the argument is straightforward. If the disclosure was permitted, there was no actual violation, and an employee who objected to it cannot establish the predicate for a statutory retaliation claim.

Practical Takeaways for Health Care Employers

  • Take every privacy complaint seriously, and respond in writing. A legally weak claim is still expensive if the record is unclear. Document what was raised, what you reviewed, and why you concluded the practice was or was not lawful.
  • Know the legal basis for your internal disclosures. Be able to point to the health care operations activity involved, such as quality review, risk management, or peer review, and to the organizational relationship between sender and recipient.
  • Keep disclosures to the people who need them. Even where disclosure is permitted, limiting access to those with a legitimate operational role supports your position and respects minimum necessary principles.
  • Separate the legal question from the employment decision. Whether an employee’s concern was legally correct is different from whether any personnel action followed. Involve counsel before acting on an employee who has recently raised a compliance concern.
  • Do not assume a complaint ends your options. After Gessner, an employee’s sincere belief alone does not establish a claim. Early dismissal may be available where the complaint does not plead an actual violation.

Conclusion

Gessner sharpens the standard in Florida whistleblower litigation: the employee must tie the claim to a real violation, and must plead facts that show one. For health care providers, where internal information sharing is both necessary and carefully regulated, that standard offers meaningful protection when the underlying practice complies with HIPAA and Florida law.

If you have questions about an employee complaint, an internal disclosure practice, or a pending retaliation claim, please contact our health care team.

DOJ Tightens the Reins on False Claims Act Enforcement

By: Anita Browning

On September 18, 2026, the Department of Justice announced two significant revisions to the Justice Manual governing how DOJ pursues False Claims Act (FCA) cases. For healthcare providers, health systems, and other entities that bill federal healthcare programs, these changes signal a shift toward narrower, more predictable enforcement. Simultaneously, these changes underscore DOJ’s continued reliance on qui tam relators as an enforcement tool.

What Changed

1. Sub-regulatory guidance can no longer create new liability.

DOJ reinstated and expanded its 2017 policy prohibiting the use of sub-regulatory guidance, such as agency memos, FAQs, bulletins, and similar materials that lack the force of law, to establish legal obligations beyond what is set out in a statute or regulation. In practical terms, this means the government cannot premise an FCA case on a provider’s failure to follow informal guidance (such as a CMS FAQ or program manual provision) unless that guidance merely interprets an existing binding requirement. DOJ framed this as a fair notice principle: providers should be liable for violating binding law, not for departing from non-binding agency commentary.

2. DOJ will more actively consider dismissing qui tam suits it declines to join.

The second revision directs DOJ attorneys to affirmatively evaluate whether to seek dismissal of whistleblower (qui tam) suits when the government declines to intervene, and to revisit that assessment as litigation progresses if circumstances change. DOJ says it will focus this dismissal authority on actions that lack legal or factual merit, waste government resources, or impose unjustified burdens on defendants.

Why It Matters for Healthcare Clients

  • Stronger defenses against “guidance-based” theories. Providers facing FCA allegations rooted in alleged departures from CMS transmittals, sub-regulatory billing guidance, or informal agency interpretations now have a clearer basis to argue that no actionable legal obligation was violated.
  • A potential check on non-intervened qui tam litigation. Because the large majority of FCA cases against healthcare entities proceed without DOJ intervention, this policy could give defendants a new avenue to seek, or press DOJ to seek, dismissal of weak relator-driven suits, particularly those built on regulatory ambiguity rather than clear-cut fraud.
  • Enforcement is narrowing, not disappearing. DOJ leadership was explicit that it intends to keep pursuing violations of binding legal and contractual obligations. Providers should not read these revisions as a retreat from FCA enforcement generally. 

Practical Takeaways

  1. Audit compliance programs to distinguish between binding regulatory requirements and informal sub-regulatory guidance your organization currently treats as mandatory.
  2. Revisit pending qui tam exposure. If your organization is defending a non-intervened relator suit, consider whether the revised Justice Manual provisions support a renewed request that DOJ exercise its dismissal authority.
  3. Document good-faith reliance on regulatory text and binding guidance when designing billing, coding, and coverage policies, since this distinction is now more consequential to liability analysis.
  4. Monitor DOJ’s implementation of these standards, as their real-world impact will depend on how U.S. Attorney’s Offices and the Civil Division apply them case by case.

Congress Just Fired a Warning Shot at Healthcare MSOs

For nearly a century, the corporate practice of medicine (“CPOM”) has primarily been a creature of state law. Healthcare entrepreneurs operating nationally have therefore become accustomed to navigating a patchwork of state ownership and control rules, often through the familiar management services organization/professional corporation (“MSO/PC”) structure. Now, for the first time, Congress is considering legislation that would approach CPOM from a truly national perspective. The recently introduced Stop Corporate Takeovers of Physicians Act would establish a federal prohibition on certain forms of corporate ownership and control of medical practices. While the bill faces an uncertain path through Congress, its significance extends well beyond whether this particular legislation ultimately passes.

What makes this proposal particularly noteworthy for healthcare regulatory professionals is the shift in regulatory authority it represents. Historically, states have determined who may own medical practices, how professional entities must be structured, and how much control a non-clinical management company may exercise over a physician-owned practice. The result is the state-by-state CPOM framework that healthcare attorneys and multi-state operators navigate today. This bill would overlay that system with a federal CPOM standard applicable nationally, while still allowing states to impose more restrictive requirements.

There is a compelling parallel to the FTC’s recent attempt to establish a nationwide rule restricting non-competes. Non-competes, like CPOM, have traditionally been regulated principally at the state level. The FTC’s effort raised significant questions about the federal government’s authority to establish a nationwide rule in an area historically governed by state law.

Similar questions are expected to surround any attempt to federalize CPOM regulation. Congress, of course, operates under a different source of authority than an administrative agency such as the FTC, so the legal analysis would not be identical. Nevertheless, the underlying issue remains central: to what extent will the federal government establish nationwide restrictions in an area of professional regulation historically left largely to the states?

That alone makes this legislation worth watching.

The substance of the bill is equally significant.

Traditional CPOM analysis generally begins with ownership: Who owns the medical practice, and does state law permit that person or entity to own it? The proposed legislation goes considerably further. It would generally require medical practices to be majority owned and controlled by qualifying licensed providers while restricting an MSO’s ability to control areas including hiring and firing, compensation, staffing, billing practices, clinical standards, and payor contracting.

It also targets several contractual mechanisms commonly used in friendly-PC structures. Most notably, the legislation would restrict MSO control over the sale or transfer of ownership interests in a medical practice—potentially eliminating the share transfer restriction arrangements commonly used to maintain continuity between an MSO and an affiliated PC. The bill would also restrict the common model in which an MSO owns the consumer-facing brand used by affiliated professional entities and would establish detailed protections surrounding physicians’ independent clinical judgment.

For national healthcare companies, another provision deserves close attention. The legislation would require qualifying licensee owners to be licensed and present in a state where services are furnished and to be substantially engaged in delivering medical care. That could fundamentally challenge the increasingly common model in which a highly licensed physician owns professional entities across numerous jurisdictions while an MSO provides the administrative infrastructure supporting the platform.

Healthcare attorneys generally would not recommend that MSOs restructure an otherwise compliant MSO/PC setup today simply because this bill has been introduced. However, close attention should be paid to what it represents. Increasing legislative and enforcement attention is being directed toward the relationship between professional practices, MSOs, and outside investors. The federal proposal puts several concepts squarely on the national agenda: ownership, control, share-transfer restrictions, branding, clinical autonomy, and the economic relationship between an MSO and its affiliated professional practice.

For healthcare entrepreneurs, investors, and physicians, the takeaway is not that the MSO/PC model is disappearing. It is that the regulatory environment surrounding that model is evolving quickly, requiring close monitoring.And now, for the first time, that conversation is no longer occurring exclusively in state legislatures and state regulatory agencies. Congress has entered the CPOM conversation.

AI Is Transforming Healthcare—But Are Your Privacy Policies Keeping Up?

Artificial intelligence is quickly becoming a standard part of healthcare operations. From ambient AI documentation tools that generate clinical notes to voice-assisted transcription platforms and automated workflow solutions, healthcare organizations are increasingly adopting technologies designed to improve efficiency and allow providers to spend more time focused on patient care.

As these tools become integrated into everyday practice, organizations should ensure their policies and compliance documentation evolve alongside the technology. AI implementation is not simply an IT decision—it also requires a thoughtful review of privacy practices, patient communications, vendor relationships, and internal governance.

Key Policies to Review

Healthcare practices adopting AI technologies should evaluate whether the following documents adequately address their use:

Notice of Privacy Practices (NPP): Consider whether the notice accurately describes how patient information may be collected, processed, stored, or disclosed through AI-assisted technologies.

Patient Consent and Intake Forms: Depending on the AI platform being used and applicable federal and state law, practices should determine whether patients should receive additional disclosures or have the opportunity to consent to—or decline—the use of AI-assisted recording or documentation during their visit.

Internal Privacy and Security Policies: Policies should address how AI tools are selected, monitored, and used by staff, including appropriate safeguards for protected health information (PHI).

Workforce Training: Employees should understand when AI tools may be used, what information may be entered into those systems, and the organization’s expectations for protecting patient privacy.

Vendor Management: Practices should verify that AI vendors handling PHI execute appropriate Business Associate Agreements (BAAs) where required and maintain HIPAA-compliant security and privacy practices.

Compliance Considerations

The use of AI may implicate several regulatory frameworks depending on the technology and the jurisdiction in which a practice operates. Organizations should evaluate their compliance obligations under HIPAA, the HITECH Act, the 21st Century Cures Act, applicable state privacy laws such as the Florida Information Protection Act (FIPA), state recording consent laws, and any applicable professional licensing requirements.

In addition to regulatory compliance, practices should establish internal procedures for evaluating new AI technologies before deployment. This includes understanding how patient data is processed, where it is stored, who has access to it, and whether the vendor’s security practices align with the organization’s compliance requirements.

Building an AI Governance Strategy

Rather than treating AI implementation as a one-time technology upgrade, healthcare organizations should incorporate AI into their ongoing compliance and risk management programs. Periodic reviews of privacy policies, consent documents, vendor agreements, and employee training materials can help ensure that organizational policies continue to reflect evolving technologies and regulatory expectations.

As AI continues to reshape healthcare delivery, practices that proactively update their policies and governance frameworks will be better positioned to integrate innovation while maintaining patient trust and supporting regulatory compliance.

Fractional Clinical Oversight vs. Legal Compliance: Why Healthcare Practices Need Both

Healthcare providers across the country, including IV hydration clinics, med spas, wellness practices, and other cash-based healthcare businesses, have increasingly faced audits and investigations by state regulatory agencies regarding alleged Corporate Practice of Medicine (“CPOM”) violations and inadequate medical director oversight. One trend has become increasingly apparent.

Many of these businesses were established with the assistance of fractional medical director or supervising physician platforms. These organizations provide a valuable service by connecting practices with qualified physicians, assisting with clinical oversight, and helping providers navigate the operational aspects of launching a healthcare business. There is undoubtedly a place for these services in today’s rapidly growing healthcare industry. The problem arises when these platforms begin providing legal guidance regarding corporate structuring and regulatory compliance.

Too often, businesses are told they are “fully compliant” simply because template documents were provided or a basic management structure was recommended. However, when a state regulatory agency requests documentation demonstrating the separation between the clinical entity and the management company, the independence of medical decision-making, the authority exercised by the medical director, or the operational safeguards required under applicable state law, the necessary legal framework simply is not there. At that point, defending the practice becomes exponentially more difficult.

Regulatory compliance is not determined by whether a set of documents exists. It is determined by whether the structure, governance, operational practices, contractual relationships, and day-to-day conduct of the business comply with the specific laws and regulations of the applicable state. Every state approaches these issues differently, and many require far more than standardized agreement terms or generalized guidance.

Unfortunately, many healthcare practices operate under the belief that they are protected or compliant because they relied upon a supervising platform’s recommendations, only to discover during an audit that the legal analysis supporting those recommendations was either incomplete or nonexistent. The result is unnecessary regulatory exposure, significant legal expense, and avoidable disruption to the business.

This is not intended as criticism of fractional supervising platforms. On the contrary, they provide an important and increasingly necessary service within the healthcare ecosystem. The issue is one of professional boundaries.

Clinical oversight should remain the responsibility of physicians and clinical experts. Corporate structuring, CPOM analysis, governance documents, management services agreements, ownership structures, and state regulatory compliance should remain the responsibility of attorneys who focus their practices in healthcare law. When each professional stays within their respective area of expertise, the healthcare provider receives the benefit of both strong clinical oversight and a legally defensible business structure.

Healthcare regulation continues to become more sophisticated, and state agencies are devoting greater resources to examining ownership structures, management arrangements, and physician oversight. Providers deserve a compliance strategy that is built not only to help them launch their business, but also to withstand regulatory scrutiny years later. The goal should never be to simply “look compliant.” The goal should be to actually be compliant and to have the documentation, governance, and legal analysis necessary to prove it when regulators come knocking.

Georgia and Tennessee Signal the Next Phase of State Stem Cell Therapy Laws

PRP facial injection treatment

By: Victoria Perniola

Regenerative medicine adoption is moving quickly, and state legislatures are beginning to expressly support it.  Some states have focused on patient disclosures, research oversight, or access to investigational therapies. Others are beginning to create more specific frameworks for how certain stem cell or regenerative medicine therapies may be offered in clinical practice when those therapies have not been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

Florida’s CS/CS/SB 1768, passed in 2025 and created Florida Statutes §§ 458.3245 and 459.0127, is an important reference point. These laws have established a legal pathway for certain non-FDA approved stem cell therapies in Florida, but only within a limited structure. It applies to licensed medical doctors (MDs) and osteopathic physicians (DOs), and the stem cell therapy must relate to orthopedics, wound care, or pain management.  The Florida Law is a “green light” with limits, but only as it relates to state laws.  The issues are still what they are at the federal level, grey.  

In May 2026, Georgia and Tennessee enacted new stem cell therapy legislation. Georgia HB 1275 was signed into law on May 11, 2026.  Tennessee HB 2246 was signed into law on May 19, 2026.  Georgia’s law expands on the Florida Law by allowing a physician assistant (PA) or nurse practitioner (NP) to perform qualifying human stem cell therapy following a lawful designation from a physician.  Florida needs to follow suit and likely will.  Even more bold, the Georgia Law does not expressly limit the therapy to orthopedics, wound care, or pain management. Tennessee expanded into a broader framework allowing stem cell therapy or regenerative medicine therapy within a physician’s scope of practice, presumably (but not expressly) incorporating midlevel application within the scope of their licenses and proper physician supervision that’s typical of mid level involvement.  

For regenerative medicine practices, med spas, wellness businesses, orthopedic practices, pain management clinics, product suppliers, and investors, the legal question is not simply whether a state has passed a stem cell law. The more important questions are: (1) what does the law say re who can provide the therapy and for what conditions, (2) what products qualify, (3) what procedures (e.g., informed consent) have to be followed, and (4) how does the new laws square with what else might be happening in each such state.   

To be clear, the new state laws aren’t creating anything other than an HOV lane within defined limits.  But that doesn’t mean that coloring outside those lines will expose clinicians to discipline.  Many such states are applying a variety of regen products (e.g., PRP, exosomes, Wharton’s Jelly, Cell Factors) that didn’t make their way into any state law.   Many non specified clinicians (e.g., dentists, chiropractors, podiatrists and mid level) are involved in each such state.  And many are administering these products for more conditions than what the new laws green light.   Assessing risks will require these business and clinicians to understand the laws, and also the regulatory environment.  

Florida’s SB 1768 as a Recent Reference Point

Florida’s SB 1768 is provides a recent and relevant comparison point for providers and businesses evaluating the newly enacted Georgia and Tennessee laws. The comparison shows how one state (Florida)  has structured a narrower pathway for certain non-FDA approved stem cell therapies, while Georgia and Tennessee appear to be moving toward broader frameworks in their respective states.

The Florida Law, one of the first states leading the charge, is ironically the most narrow in terms of what can be done and who can do it.   Qualifying therapies must be performed by an MD or DO licensed in Florida, and must relate only to orthopedics, wound care, or pain management. The statute also includes operational requirements tied to product sourcing, facility registration and accreditation, post-thaw viability reporting, advertising disclosures, informed consent, and physician discipline.

That structure gives Florida providers a framework to evaluate, but it also leaves out the many clinicians already active in the space as well as many therapies that are common in the regenerative medicine space. Practices focused on longevity, inflammation, recovery, aesthetics, sexual wellness, functional medicine, or broader regenerative health may not fit squarely within the narrow Florida Law.  Which is why looking at this law and the others is just a starting point for compliance.  Serious businesses in the space also have to know what’s being done at the regulatory level, not just what a law (that anyone can read) says.  

Florida gets that and has formed a Stem Cell Therapy Workgroup to study implementation issues, including how accrediting and certifying bodies should be evaluated, how the Florida Department of Health should assess additional entities with expertise in stem cell therapy, and what standards may be needed for consistent oversight.  It makes sense that the Workgroup conversation will open the door to expanding the law to meet the current treatment reality in the state.  

With that framework in mind, Georgia and Tennessee are useful comparisons because each state appears to respond to a different limitation in the Florida model. Georgia correctly addresses big miss in the Florida Law, that Florida’s current framework does not allow NPs or PAs to perform qualifying stem cell therapy.  Tennessee is also asking the right question when it addresses whether the law should extend beyond stem cell therapy into a broader regenerative medicine therapy framework.  Florida may have gotten the ball rolling, but both Georgia and Tennessee caught it and are running with it.  

Georgia’s Law Expands Who May Perform Stem Cell Therapy

The Georgia Law expressly allows an NP or PA to perform human stem cell therapy following a lawful designation from a physician.  The Georgia Law requires the therapy to be used for treatment or procedures within the scope of practice of the physician, NP, or PA, and the patient to be properly advised in writing.  In this way, the Georgia Law is more aligned with what’s actually happening in regen practices.  

Even with this broader language, practices should be careful not to treat the Georgia statute as a simple delegation pathway. The statute refers to a “lawful designation” from a physician, which means practices will need to evaluate how that designation should be documented, what level of physician involvement is required, and whether the therapy falls within the scope of practice of the NP or PA performing the service.

The statute may create room for a more flexible clinical structure, but it also raises important compliance questions. Before offering services under this framework, practices should review provider roles, written protocols, supervision or collaboration requirements, patient selection criteria, informed consent, adverse event response, and medical record documentation.  And like the Florida Law, Georgia regen practices need to understand what’s actually happening in the state and how regulators are responding (if at all).  

Georgia Is Not Limited to Orthopedics, Wound Care, or Pain Management

Georgia’s law is also different from Florida’s current framework because it does not expressly limit human stem cell therapy to orthopedic conditions, wound care, or pain management.  This is where reality meets regulation, which is rare with new regulations.  This structure gives Georgia’s law a broader practical reach than the Florida Law.  Instead of asking only whether the therapy falls within orthopedics, wound care, or pain management, the Georgia analysis turns on whether the therapy falls within the applicable provider’s scope of practice and whether the statute’s other requirements are met.

This is especially relevant for regenerative medicine businesses, nearly all of which operate well beyond orthopedics, pain management, and wound care. All of that makes the Georgia Law far more compatible with the fast growing longevity sector, where therapies are meshed together for outcomes.  

Georgia providers still need to review the product, the intended use, the claims being made, the route of administration, the patient population, the provider’s license, the supplier documentation, and the federal regulatory status of the product. Compared to Florida’s narrower law, Georgia’s law gives certain practices more flexibility.

Tennessee Broadens the Conversation to Regenerative Medicine Therapy

The Tennessee Law is important, but for a different reason. The version of the Tennessee bill as originally introduced looked more similar to Florida’s enacted framework. It focused on stem cell therapy and limited the therapy to orthopedics, wound care, and pain management.  However, that is not the version Tennessee enacted. Before passage, the bill was amended to broaden the statutory framework. As enacted, the Tennessee Law authorizes a physician to perform stem cell therapy or regenerative medicine therapy not approved by the FDA, so long as the therapy is used for a treatment or procedure within the physician’s scope of practice.  That said, the Tennessee Law does create a gap in failing to specifically include NPs and PAs, as Georgia did.  

The regenerative medicine market is not limited to one product category. Practices and suppliers may be dealing with cellular products, tissue-based products, Wharton’s jelly-related products, exosome-based products, or other biologic-adjacent offerings. Tennessee’s enacted framework appears to account for a broader product universe by creating requirements tied to product documentation, certificates of analysis, sterility reports, manufacturer information, advertising notices, informed consent, adverse event reporting, and clinical outcomes registries.

For businesses watching this space, Tennessee may be an early example of a state moving beyond traditional “stem cell therapy” language and into a broader regenerative medicine framework.

What These Laws Mean for Regenerative Medicine Practices

Many regenerative medicine businesses utilize many prescribing and treating professionals to administer many regen therapies for a whole host of matters.  And that gap needs to get filled over time at state level regulation.  We expect that to happen over time.  Even then, regen business have to continue to look at the entire regulatory enforcement landscape and differentiate between “what the law says” from what’s happening in their state.  

State Law is Only Part of the Analysis

While most of the regulatory activity is happening at the state level, businesses and clinicians still be mindful of the federal framework.  From a federal perspective, the analysis depends on the product itself and how it is being used. Providers and businesses should consider the product’s source, how it is processed, whether it is being used for a homologous purpose, whether it is autologous or allogeneic, the route of administration, and the claims being made. They should also consider whether the product fits within the 361 HCT/P framework, i.e., human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products. In general, the 361 HCT/P framework refers to certain products regulated under Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act and 21 C.F.R. Part 1271. If a product does not fit within that framework, it may be regulated as a drug or biologic requiring additional FDA authorization.  Though state based laws are flowing, the federal framework is still relevant and important.  

Final Thoughts

State regulators are driving the bus in terms of creating clearer pathways for regen.  More work need sot happen here.  And a central unifying body to hold those conversations would help big time.  That said, one this is clear:  regen is here to stay.  And no one seems to want to put that genie back int he bottle.  

Telehealth Rules for Medical Spas in Florida: Complete Compliance Guide for 2026

Telehealth has become an important tool for Florida medical spas offering virtual consultations, follow-ups, and aesthetic healthcare services. This guide explains telehealth rules for medical spas in Florida, covering compliance requirements, provider responsibilities, HIPAA standards, documentation practices, and legal considerations to help med spa businesses operate safely and successfully.

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The Regulatory Middle Ground: Navigating Non-Pharmacy Supply Chains in Clinical Practice

Pharmacist scanning medication in pharmacy

By: Caitlin A. Kopppenhaver, Attorney

The traditional landscape of clinical procurement often centers on two familiar pillars: the 503A compounding pharmacy and the 503B outsourcing facility. Because these entities are commonly associated with patient-specific compounded preparations and certain compounded sterile product models, many providers operate under the assumption that these are the only legal avenues for acquiring sterile products. However, as the wellness industry evolves toward specialized peptides and complex biologics, a significant knowledge gap has emerged regarding the roles of manufacturers, wholesale distributors, and third-party logistics providers (3PLs).

This gap becomes particularly evident when a workflow involves the receipt of lyophilized products intended for provider-controlled reconstitution and immediate administration. In these scenarios, the entity shipping the product may not be a pharmacy at all, and the workflow may still be supportable if the required regulatory elements are satisfied. The confusion often stems from a lack of familiarity with how title transfer and licensure operate outside of the pharmacy model. Unlike a pharmacy, which dispenses or compounds within a pharmacy framework, a manufacturer or distributor may sell or transfer product within a drug-supply-chain framework, and a 3PL generally facilitates the movement of that product without ever taking legal ownership.

The critical distinction for any clinical practice lies in the classification of the product being supplied and the nature of the final preparation step. When a lyophilized vial arrives from a 3PL or distributor, the responsibility for the final preparation may shift to the clinician or clinical practice, depending on the product, labeling, and ordering pathway. This process raises important questions about the boundary between compounding and reconstitution consistent with manufacturer labeling or instructions. While federal and state regulations may provide a pathway for certain non-pharmacy supply-chain models, the specific legal mechanics that allow a non-pharmacy to participate in such a workflow remain a nuance of supply-chain law that is frequently overlooked.

For practices utilizing these models, the challenge is ensuring that the administrative handling on-site does not inadvertently cross the line into unlicensed compounding. Understanding the interplay between federal distribution standards and the local practice of medicine is essential. Without a clear grasp of how a 3PL differs from a traditional pharmacy in the eyes of the law, a practice may find itself operating within a sophisticated supply chain without fully understanding the regulatory guardrails that make it possible. Identifying these structural differences is the first step in mastering the complexities of modern medical procurement.

LinkedIn Callout:

A lot of clinicians are familiar with two procurement pathways: 503A compounding pharmacies and 503B outsourcing facilities.

But those are not the only entities that may appear in a lawful medical supply chain.

Depending on the product and the structure, a clinical practice may also encounter manufacturers, wholesale distributors, private-label suppliers, and third-party logistics providers. These entities do not all serve the same legal function, and they should not be analyzed as if they are pharmacies.

This is where a lot of confusion comes up.

For example, if a product is supplied in lyophilized form and requires provider-controlled reconstitution before administration, the legal question is not simply: “Did this come from a pharmacy?”

The better questions are:

Who manufactured the product?

Is the product itself lawfully marketable for the intended use?

Who sold it?

Who took title?

Who shipped it?

How is it labeled?

Is the supplier properly licensed or registered?

What exactly is the provider doing on-site?

Is the provider reconstituting consistent with labeling/instructions, or doing something that starts to look like compounding, repackaging, dispensing, or manufacturing?

That analysis is highly fact-specific.

Some non-pharmacy supply-chain models may be supportable. Others may create significant regulatory exposure, especially where the product, labeling, title transfer, licensure, or on-site handling is not clearly understood.

The takeaway is not that every non-pharmacy model works, but rather that “not a pharmacy” does not automatically mean “not lawful”,  and it also does not automatically mean the model is safe. The legal analysis follows the actual flow of the product, not just the label placed on the supplier.