ACOs are S.T.U.P.I.D

We have probably never seen so much enthusiasm and spending on anything in our history as we are on healthcare reform. The point is to slow spending and improve quality by incentivizing cost-saving, quality-enhancing behavior. And the Accountable Care Organization is the new healthcare delivery model designed to save us from our greedy, over-utilizing selves. Here’s how it works:

First, you take a lot of primary care physicians and tell them they will get more money by (1) taking an expanded role in taking care of patients, and (2) reducing the expenses associated with that care. Then you tell them two really special things: first, you tell them “Uh, since we’re afraid that you will improperly reduce the amount of care the patients need, we won’t tell you which patients are in an ACO and which are not.” Second, you tell them “We really mean it when we tell you that we intend for you to make more money, but we won’t tell you exactly how we’re gonna do that. Trust us, ok?”

Second, you empower physicians to lead the charge. After all, they’re the only participants in ACOs that smart people think can control costs and quality. And you do this by telling them to (1) shell out about $26 Million to form an ACO, (2) go to Wharton and get an MBA, (3) educate themselves about all the intricacies of information technology and work out the kinks involved in implementing electronic medical records, and (4) keep taking care of those patients while you do all this. Finally, you keep the identity of patients secret from the physicians so there is no way to prepare care plans that take into account the diseases faced by the patients. No problem.

Third, you let patients run amok. They can go into an ACO…or not. They can go in and out of ACOs. They’re like kids that way, but they’re responsible for reading the 397 pages of ACO regs and then deciding whether they like the idea of not. Oh, and they have absolutely no incentive to sign up for ACO care. And why would they? “Hey, how about you go with this ACO, which will get more money if they spend less on you. How’s that sound?” How could this possibly be sold to Medicare patients? “This ACO will get paid for getting you well! Your primary care doctor that you’ve trusted for 20 years and who helps you get and stay healthy…that person doesn’t have the same incentive to get you well.” NOT.

Simplicity. There is none. Never before in our history have we seen something so simple (patient rationing) become so complicated (rationing = less expensive care). And so many acronyms and governmental departments and positions too! There are one sided models, two sided models and now a Pioneer model, for those who are especially adventurous. And did I mention that the basis for healthcare reform, the one that only the state of Washington has the courage to articulate, is really just rationing?

Troubling to pretty much everyone. Yes. Except for policy makers, there has yet to be any significant support for anything other than the IDEA that healthcare should cost less and be more outcome oriented. Even the Mayo, Geisinger and Cleveland systems have all politely declined at this point.

Unlimited flexibility. Yes, this is true, especially as it relates to patients. See, patients can be in a cost saving ACO or not. They can go in and out of them and the ACO will bear the cost. That’s right: patients can go in and out of them—ACO, non-ACO, and yet only the ACO will be penalized for cost increases. Let’s see, the ACO model is the cost saving model. And the plan is to allow patients to choose for society to save money or not. And the patients have zero incentives for participating in an ACO. And who is responsible for the behavior of these patients? Uh, well, we all are.

Patient accountability. This is completely lacking in the ACO model. There is absolutely nothing to incentivize patients for making healthy decisions and to punish them for making unhealthy ones. Also primary care driven. Not really. There aren’t enough to go around, but some guy who knows a doctor is free to see you now. Oh, also pro competitive, meaning everyone will wanna be an ACO, so that will create competition in the market and a tremendous drive to drive costs down and quality up. Ok, not really, but wouldn’t it be nice if that COULD happen. In fact, healthcare reform is functioning to do one sure thing—reduce competition, since only the biggest, strongest organizations can afford to compete or to be one.

Inexpensive. Nah. While the initial cost projections suggested about a $2 Million price tag for forming one, they are now up in the $12 to 26 Million range.

Direct and demonstrative. NOT. The entire healthcare reform delivery plan is like pushing a mouse through a maze by its tail.

Healthcare reform is like Alice in Wonderland at its best. It only makes sense on mind-altering drugs. Moreover, the shizo message from our policymakers on the whole issue is dumbfounding. “We are committed to lowering healthcare costs. ACOs will do this. Patients can be in them…or not.” Some legislators think they’ve created a panacea with ACOs, but then don’t want to compel them. It’s just political nonsense.

Look, slowing healthcare cost creep and quality enhancement are good things. We all (patients included) ought to be outcome driven and focused so that the end result is actually healthcare. ACOs just don’t and won’t do that, which may have something to do with the recent announcement by Mayo, Cleveland and Geisinger that they’re really not that interested in playing with them.


So, What are ACO's Really All About?

Policymaker: Well, we’re pretty excited about these ACO regs

Reporter: These ACOs are really supposed to lower healthcare costs and improve quality?

Policymaker: You bet. We really believe in them. It’s the a common sense model that is primary care driven.

Reporter: So, then I suppose all the Medicare patients are gonna be in them, so that we get the cost reduction and health benefits?

Policymaker: Ummm, no. We don’t want to require that. We want to design the perfect system, but we don’t want to require anyone to use it.

Reporter: Why not? If you believe in it, why not just implement it?

Policymaker: It’s not American to require people to do anything.

Reporter: That’s confusing. What’s the value of having spent so much time and money on the perfect system if it isn’t actually implemented?

Policymaker: Oh, it will be! Trust me, when Medicare patients see the value of being in a healthcare delivery model that makes more money by reducing the amount spent on care, they’re gonna flock to it.

Reporter: How will you know?

Policymaker: Great question. We’re gonna track it. We’re gonna assign the patients to an ACO and then watch the cost fall and the quality rise.

Reporter: How is the patient gonna feel about being assigned to an ACO, one where maybe their physician isn’t even participating?

Policymaker: Oh, no problem at all. Good care is good care. We think the physician patient relationship is overrated.

Reporter: Really? It seems so personal and essential.

Policymaker: Not really. We just think that. We’re not even gonna tell physicians who’s in an ACO or not?

Reporter: Why not?

Policymaker: Cause we think physicians might prefer the money from reducing costs over helping people get well.

Reporter: So you think paying physicians for saving money will cause them to provide insufficient care?

Policymaker: No, we think paying them to provide really excellent care will drive costs sky high.

Reporter: So is the goal to reduce the quality of care?

Policymaker: No, just the amount of it, because the more you provide, the more it costs.

Reporter: Sounds like healthcare reform is about rationing.

Policymaker: (Laughs). Oh my, no! That would never fly. What we have to do is to make sure patients get exactly what they want and, at the same time, reduce costs.

Reporter: And ACOs will do that?

Policymaker: You bet. That’s the magic. By providing the perfect system and then by mixing it with patient choice and secrecy, we’re convinced we’ll see reduced costs and higher quality.


Considering Buying Into a Practice? You Need to Read This

ownerYou’re an employed physician in a small practice and all the practice revenue comes from treating patients in your office and in hospitals. You’ve been offered an opportunity to become an owner in the practice and you’re not sure how to view it.

Here is what is happening with medical practices, value-wise. The values are the lowest in 25 years. A buy-in, for instance, typically consists of only the following: the fixed assets (usually a lower “book” value) and whatever your share of the receivables is (typically not purchased). The only additional amount paid is for the “good will” or “going concern” value when the practice generates “passive revenue,” such as physical therapy or diagnostic imaging. That means medical practices aren’t worth much and no one is really lining up to buy them.

So then why would an “older” or more established doctor bring someone in? First, you must know that the growth of practices has slowed a lot with the economy issues. Second, owners hope to (1) have a better lifestyle, (2) find someone to generate a profit until they insist on being an owner, (3) find someone who can share overhead expenses, and (4) find someone who can pay them to own a portion, then buy them out when they’re ready to retire. Without some younger physician on track to become an owner, older physicians really have (1) no way to make a profit, (2) no way to slow down, (3) no one to share overhead with, and (4) no one to buy their practices, which many thought would be their retirement money.

Once you agree on it, how does the purchase price get paid? Typically, buy ins are paid for in whole or in part via a salary offset so that you pay for it on a “pre tax” basis, meaning that the founder gets the money before you receive it. That way, for instance, you don’t have to generate $140K worth on income, pay taxes and have only $100K left over to pay the founder.

With all of this in mind, you need to know what the “standard” arrangement for buy-ins is. The employer will employ someone for 2-4 years before offering them ownership. When ownership is offered, here’s what the structure usually looks like (about 90% of the time, in my experience)—

1. The purchase price consists only of the depreciated value of the fixed assets;
2. Since there is no “passive” revenue, there is nothing added to the purchase price;
3. The purchase price is paid for in a combination of pre tax and post tax, meaning you write a check for some of it when you sign the documents (post-tax), and the rest is paid for on a salary offset (pre-tax);
4. The employee “leaves” his receivables, meaning whatever profit remains from his/her services stays with the employer and the employee/new owner starts accruing receivables from 0;
5. If there is a noncompete involved (there is about 50% of the time), it exists only when the buy in is being paid, unless all the owners are bound by one;
6. You become an equal owner right away;
7. You become a board member right away;
8. The “founder” has control over a select list of issues, typically in a tie breaker voting fashion;
9. The overhead is allocated between the owners on some combination of equally and based on their relative productivity (collections);
10. Income is typically on an “eat what you kill” basis;
11. Employment agreements are exactly the same (except for the noncompete during the buy in); and
12. In the rare event that someone receives extra compensation for management (maybe 20% of the time), the fees are about $50K/year.

More specifically—

The practice. practices typically only have one class of owners. If there are two specified, this may mean the income is double taxed. This is something you and your accountant need to discuss. This is nearly unheard of in this day and age (and for at least the past 15 years). As mentioned, owners are typically treated as equals, except with respect to the buy in and occasionally a noncompete during the buy in period.

Amount of stock. The amount of stock given to you means nothing in terms of how much each person makes. Stock pertains to how much profit will be distributed and how much each would receive if the practice was sold (not happening). Why? Because the issue of how much a person receives from practicing medicine is nearly always an issue of compensation (addressed in the employment agreement). A person could own 99% of the P.A. and only receive 1% of the income. Ownership and compensation have nothing to do with one another.

More stock. I have seen very few circumstances where the younger doctor received less than equal shares initially. There was, however, an escalator provision in the shareholder agreement that allowed him to get more so he would be equal once the income hit a certain target. Though this is an odd provision for a medical practice (for the reasons described—ownership does not = money), it certainly could be employed.

Direction and control. I have never seen a circumstance where a younger physician who becomes an owner is not on the board and has no say in any issues affecting the practice. I have, however, seen circumstances where the older physician has the deciding vote on such things as (1) whether to bring in a shareholder, and (2) whether to sell the practice.

Compensation. Here’s what I’m most accustomed to—each owner has income attributed to him/her and expenses allocated. For instance, against $1M in revenue, there might be “direct” expenses of $50K (e.g. automobile, health insurance, professional dues and such, entertainment); and “indirect” expenses (overhead) allocated some of it equally and some of it on the basis of productivity, meaning the one who earns more pays more of these expenses. The second most common arrangement is to split everything equally.

Extra money to the founding physician. It is rare, as described above. When it is done, they are set at some reasonable, flat level.

Employment contract differences. Never seen it. When one becomes an owner, there is the real and emotional issue of equality. Owners insist on it, though they understand that those who bring in more money receive more income.

Termination without cause. Here’s how I see it being handled—(1) it applies to all owners and generally requires the approval of a supermajority of the owners (when each owner has an equal vote); or (2) there is none. One can be terminated for cause only.

Malpractice. Practices (1) go bare; or (2) pay for each owner’s $250K/$750K coverage and tail; or (3) require it and allocate the expense to each owner.

Buying out. The most common thing in practices is that retiring owners walk away with their share of the fixed assets (on a depreciated basis) and their receivables. If by that time you have passive revenue sources, such as an MRI in the practice, then typically you would pay an anticipated portion of those profits to him for some period of time (no more than one year). The shares are bought for maybe $1/share. The value of the medical practice is the ability of a physician to earn a living while there. That’s really all there is in today’s market. When you remove the physician, the value goes away with them, since there is no one to pay the overhead and no one to generate patient referrals. Disability is typically handled the same way, though death usually comes with it life insurance, which passes through to his estate and “pays for” his shares.

Now, let’s take a step back: why are you becoming an owner? If it does not appear that the employer wants you to be one, you have to ask whether it make sense. What do you receive for becoming an owner? Do you get more out of being an owner than being an employee? Does not make more sense to just respond by saying “Hey, I realize you don’t really want me to be an owner, so why not just keep me as an employee and give me [a raise]?”

How to look at these opportunities. Very simple. With people who have lots of experience. That usually means an accountant and a lawyer. Even then, you have to understand how to approach these opportunities. There are three stages: (1) discussions; (2) agreements; and (3) negotiation. Many physicians think you just get legal documents and hire someone to review them. This doesn’t make any sense because you could read them yourself and see whether or not they reflect your business understanding or expectation. You have to have detailed conversations (away from patients) to see if you are conceptually even on the same page; and you ought to consult with experienced professionals in this stage or you may miss an important conceptual issue. Only once you are sure that you see eye to eye does it make sense to look at documents.

When you get the documents, be prepared for them not to read they way you expected. Miscommunication between lawyers and clients is common and some clients and/or lawyers, as a way of negotiating, intentionally provide documents that don’t reflect the deal. The best way to use your hired consultants is for you to review the documents first and to discuss with the employer any discrepancies you notice. Only then should you have the lawyer and/or accountant provide their detailed comments.

Finally, you have to remember that the deal is yours. Once the accountants and lawyers are gone, you still show up every day and “live” in that practice. For that reason, you have to maintain your composure. The buy in process is a process and it can be upsetting in moments. Focus on practicing medicine and let your advisors advise you. At the end of the day though, you have to make the decision about what’s best for you, not your lawyer or accountant. Let them advise you, but don’t let them drive the bus.

FHLF Attorney Jeff Cohen recently presented a live webinar on the topic of “Physicians Becoming Employed.” You can download a copy of his informative presentation here! 

Florida Responds in Government's Appeal of Reform Litigation

Per BNA Health Law Reporter – BREAKING NEWS
Florida and 25 other states May 4 responded to Obama administration arguments for overturning a ruling that invalidated the entire landmark federal health reform law, based on a finding that one unconstitutional provision could not be divorced from the remainder of the law (Florida v. HHS, 11th Cir., No. 11-11021, response brief filed 5/4/11).
In a press release, Florida Attorney General Pamela Jo Bondi (R) said the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), enacted in March 2010, “dramatically oversteps Congress’s power and intrudes on our personal freedom.” She said the state and its coplaintiffs are “look[ing] forward to presenting our case to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in June and, soon thereafter, to the U.S. Supreme Court.”
The states argued in the brief that PPACA “pushes even the most expansive conception of the federal government’s constitutional powers past the breaking point” in at least two respects: by imposing a “direct mandate on individuals to obtain health insurance” and by expanding the Medicaid program beyond boundaries imposed on Congress’s spending power.
Expanding on the first argument, which challenged Congress’s authority under the Constitution’s commerce clause to enact the individual mandate, or minimum coverage provision, the states argued that this is “the first time in our Nation’s history that Congress has required individuals to enter into commerce as a condition of living in the United States.” The individual mandate is scheduled to take effect in 2014 and will require virtually all citizens to purchase health insurance or pay a penalty.
If the individual mandate is upheld based on the government’s interest in controlling health care costs, the states said, then Congress likewise would have authority to “order individuals to eat more vegetables and fewer desserts, to exercise at least 45 minutes per day, to sleep at least eight hours per day, and to drink one glass of wine a day but never any beer.”
The nonstate coplaintiffs, the National Federation of Independent Business, Kaj Ahlberburg, and May Brown, filed a separate response brief. They argued that the “mandate lacks any foundation in constitutional text or precedent,” and “cannot be justified as permissible Commerce Clause activity.”
The case, an appeal from a decision of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida, is one of the first to reach the appellate level. Oral argument is scheduled for June 8.


OIG Advisory Opinion Nicks the Heels of "Company Model" Arrangements

palm beach county task force

A “company model” arrangement is reasonably popular in surgery centers these days. The model entails a legal entity owned by both anesthesiologists and referring surgeons, which performs anesthesia. Why not just have the surgery center contract with an anesthesia group to performs those services? Because the referring surgeons who are owners of the surgery center want to share some of the anesthesia fees. Does it raise fee splitting and fraud and abuse issues? You bet, but there is no real clear or direct legal guidance from any governmental body yet. A recent OIG Advisory Opinion will have physicians and healthcare lawyers alike buying new spectacles to keep a closer watch on how the legal issues unfold.Continue reading

Anti Trust Concerns Greatly Affect Healthcare Reform – Part 3 of 3

A Good Trend

Healthcare reform is causing the Department of Justice and other regulators to do two nearly unprecedented things in the history of anti-trust law:  innovate and cooperate.  I’m exaggerating, but the truth is that healthcare reform has lit a huge fire under the…ummm…butt of government regulators to find ways to facilitate competing healthcare providers to “come together” for the sake of reducing cost and improving quality. 

 Several years ago, the Department of Justice has lightened its almost unworkable antitrust restrictions by: (1) expanding the Arule of reason@ analysis for determining whether the antitrust laws have been breached, (2) expanding the notion of shared financial risk beyond mere capitation; and (3) expanding the role of the Amessenger.@  Though the role of so called Messenger Model organizations (e.g. IPAs) provide to be a failure, the fact that the DOJ would consider other ways of creating “substantial economic risk” was shocking.  And now, what is even more shocking is that the DOJ recently:  (1) promised to view all ACO proposals essentially more leniently, and (2) agreed in a joint statement with the HHS Office of Inspector General (which has primary enforcement authority on such things as Stark and Anti Kickback violations) to cooperate with eachother to facilitate the development and roll out of ACOs.

 Rule of Reason

For those who appreciate a little more depth, possible antitrust violations are analyzed by governmental authorities using either Aper se@ or Arule of reason@ analysis.  Violations considered to be Aper se@ violations are indefensible, regardless of possible good intent or even positive market effects.  Examples include: (1) two or more physicians agreeing to charge specific fees for certain procedures in their respective, independent practices, and (2) two or more physicians agreeing not to do business with a particular HMO. 

In contrast, rule of reason analysis requires enforcement authorities to probe deeper into the investigated arrangement to see if the arrangement furthers or conflicts with the principles underlying the antitrust laws.  This type of analysis gives the investigated parties an opportunity to justify their arrangement; per se analysis does not.

The revised Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, issued several years ago by the DOJ, expanded application of the rule of reason analysis to situations previously viewed as per se violations.  For instance, a provider network has traditionally had to be financially integrated through capitation or withholds to receive rule of reason analysis, and discounted fee for service arrangements with the network sent many physicians to antitrust defense attorneys during enforcement actions based on the network=s negotiations of other payment arrangements.  And now, with healthcare reform, they want to go further.

Continue reading

Anti Trust Concerns Greatly Affect Healthcare Reform – Part 2: Illustrations

Case #1:  A payer approaches you and several of your colleagues, who are competitors.  The payer gives you a contract and fee schedule, which you review with your colleagues.  Though the payer recognizes that you are not a physician group practice, it would like to deal with just one of you for contracting purposes.  You choose one of you to Arepresent@ the group of you, and seek changes in the contract, including the fee schedule.

Impression: The Sherman Act has been violated.  Since you and your colleagues are competitors and are not members of a single professional corporation through which you conduct all or substantially all of your professional practices, you may not discuss fees among yourselves, and you may not appoint someone to act as the voice of the Agroup.@  In addition to the price fixing described above, if you decided together not to contract with the payer, you would have engaged in a group boycott.

The violations can be avoided by properly structuring a formal group and adhering to certain rules in negotiating with payers.  In scrutinizing activities of a physician organization, one of the key things antitrust enforcement authorities will examine is the degree of the organization=s Aeconomic integration,@ the degree to which economic risk is shared among the shareholders.  The level of integration is key in determining whether the organization is a single economic unit or whether it is comprised of two or more economic units.

Determining whether a physician organization is sufficiently integrated is often, however, an extremely difficult task.  The law changes and is very fact-specific.  The FTC looks to such things as: 1) whether the organization is capitated; 2) the extent services are centralized in the organization; and 3) accountability of the shareholders to the organization through such things as utilization management, quality assurance and peer review.


Anti Trust Concerns Greatly Affect Healthcare Reform – Part 1: The Basics

Anti-trust laws are one of the greatest obstacles to healthcare reform.  Here’s why?  They limit the way competing physicians, hospitals and the like can do business together.  Healthcare reform requires competing providers of all kinds to come together to deliver care in the most cost effective and quality enhancing way, and yet federal and state anti-trust restrictions frustrate nearly every effort to do so.  Let’s take a quick peek behind the curtain. 

Basics 

The Sherman Act is a key federal law which is comprised of two sections: Section 1, prohibits concerted action which unreasonably restrains competition; and Section 2, generally prohibits monopolies.

For there to be a violation of Section 1, there must be an Aagreement@ and it must unreasonably restrain competition.  For there to be an agreement, there must be more than one Aeconomic unit@ involved.  That is, there can be no such agreement by one economic unit with itself.  For example, generally speaking, shareholders in the same corporation are, for antitrust purposes, legally incapable of engaging in illegal concerted action together if they share substantial economic risk.  They are generally considered to be part of a single economic unit.  Conversely, members of two or more competing economic units, separate professional corporations, for example, may not agree to a whole host of things, because such agreements would violate one or more antitrust laws.

Some agreements are considered to be so egregious that they need not even restrain competition.  The mere fact that such an agreement has occurred is enough, and there is no defense.  Some of these Aper se@ violations of the antitrust laws include: agreement among two or more independent physicians to charge a particular amount for a particular service (Aprice fixing@); agreement among two or more independent physicians not to contract with a particular HMO (Aboycotting@); agreement among two or more independent physicians regarding their hours of operation, the services they will offer, or the geographic areas they will serve (Amarket allocation@).  This is by no means a complete list or a complete description of the antitrust laws, but describes some types of activities that will violate antitrust laws.